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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

<

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the district court have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Tracy

sufficient to ensue with its contempt proceedings? Although the question of
whether a person has been served with process is a fact question, whether a person
is properly served is a question of law. Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 n.3
(Utah 1991).
2.

Did the district court properly find Mr. Tracy to be in contempt of

the court's prior child support order? On appeal, a court of review looks to a trial
court's exercise of its contempt power to determine whether it exceeded the scope
of its lawful discretion. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976);
see also Dansie v. Dansie. 1999 UT App 92, ^ 65 977 P.2d 539 ("An order relating
to contempt of court is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.").
3.

Did the district court err in refusing to offset Mr. Tracy's child

support arrears? Interpretation of the Child Support Act presents a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness, see Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob
Family Chalk Creek, LLC, 2010 UT App 112, 233 P.3d 529 ("The proper
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which we review for
correctness . . . . " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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DETERMINATIVE LAW AND RULES INVOLVED
The determinative statutory provision and rule involved in this case are as follows:
1.

Utah Code § 78B-6-315(1), (2), and (3), which states, in part:

(1) When a court of competent jurisdiction . . . makes an order
requiring a parent to furnish support... for his child, and the parent
fails to do so, proof of noncompliance shall be prima facie evidence
of contempt of court.
(2) Proof of noncompliance may be demonstrated by showing that:
(a) the order was made, and filed with the district court; and
(b) the parent knew of the order because:
(i) the order was mailed to the parent at his last-known
address as shown on the court records;
(ii) the parent was present in court at the time the order was
pronounced;
(iii) the parent entered into a written stipulation and the
parent or counsel for the parent was sent a copy of the order;
(iv) counsel was present in court and entered into a
stipulation which was accepted and the order based upon the
stipulation was then sent to counsel for the parent; or
(v) the parent was properly served and failed to answer.
(3) Upon establishment of a prima facie case of contempt under
Subsection (2), the obligor under the child support order has the
burden of proving inability to comply with the child support order.
2.

Rule 4(c)(1) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which
it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name,
address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state
the time within which the defendant is required to answer the
complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of
failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against the
defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the
court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten
days of service.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
1.

This proceeding originated in the Fourth District Court, State of

Utah, under case no. 904400716. (R. 1-3). The parties are parents of one child,
but were never married. (R. 1-3).
2.

An order for child support was entered approximately August 8,

1995, requiring Mr. Tracy to pay $250.00 per month in child support to Ms.
Vicchrilli. (R.at85).
3.

On November 11, 2009, Ms. Vicchrilli filed a motion for order to

show cause seeking judgment against Mr. Tracy, for unpaid child support. (R. at
111). Her motion was supported by an affidavit and an order to show cause issued
by the district court requiring Mr. Tracy to appear. (R. 112-116).
4.

The hearing was scheduled for January 11, 2010, before

Commissioner Thomas R. Patton, and Mr. Tracy failed to appear, (R. at 115),
though he was personally served on December 29, 2009. (R. 124, 130). A default
judgment was entered against him in the amount of $11,670.00 for past-due child
support and Ms. Vicchrilli was awarded attorney fees in the amount of $750.00.
(R. 131, 135-138).
5.

The Commissioner further found Mr. Tracy in contempt of court and

sentenced Mr. Tracy to two days jail, which sentence was stayed pending his
entering (within 60 days) into a written payment plan with Ms. Vicchrilli to satisfy
his back-due support obligation no later than two years from January 11, 2010. (R.
at 131).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

6.

On February 19,2010, Mr. Tracy filed an objection to the

Commissioner's recommendation. (R. 133-134).
7.

An objection hearing was held before Judge Samuel D. McVey on

June 14, 2010, at which time the court set aside the Commissioner's January 11,
2010, recommendation concerning Mr. Tracy's default, but entered judgment
against Mr. Tracy in the amount of $8,670.00 for undisputed back-due child
support and scheduled a de novo hearing for July 26, 2010, to address (1) whether
Mr. Tracy owed or should be credited an additional $3,000.00 in back-due child
support, and (2) whether Mr. Tracy was in contempt of court and should be subject
to additional sanctions. (R. at 169).
8.

At the July 26, 2010, hearing, the court received evidence and

argument from the parties, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
stated the order of the court from the bench. (R. 231-232).
9.

In summary, the court denied Mr. Tracy's request to apply the

$3,000.00 credit to his arrearages and entered judgment of $11,670.00 in back-due
support plus attorney fees in favor of Ms. Vicchrilli and ordered Mr. Tracy to
make minimum monthly payments of $250.00 commencing August 2010 towards
satisfaction of said judgment. (R. 244-250).
10.

The court found Mr. Tracy in contempt of court, but scheduled a

review hearing for December 3, 2010, to provide Mr. Tracy an opportunity to
purge his contempt by being current in his monthly payments at that time. The
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court informed that further sanctions would result if Mr. Tracy was not compliant
with the court's orders at the December 3, 2010, hearing. (R. 244-248).
11.

(

The orders were signed by the court on August 30, 2010, and Notice

of Appeal was filed by Mr. Tracy on or about September 3, 2010. (R. at 252).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court orders finding Mr. Tracy in contempt of court for failure
to pay child support as well as the judgment amount for arrears should be
affirmed.
The court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Tracy inasmuch as he was
properly served a valid order to show cause notifying him of the initial hearing
before the court commissioner and because he fully participated in two subsequent
hearings before the trial judge.
Because Mr. Tracy (1) knew of the child support order and his duty to
make monthly payments, (2) had the ability to comply with the child support
order, and (3) willfully disobeyed the order by failing to make any payments for a
number of years, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding him in
contempt of court and entering judgment based on the evidence.
Finally, the trial court properly denied Mr. Tracy's request to apply a credit
to his back-due child support in the amount of $3,000.00. Mr. Tracy asserts that
said amount was given directly to the parties' daughter after she became an adult,
for college expenses, and that such merits offset to the amount owed Ms.
Vicchrilli. It is well-settled law in Utah that back-due support is owed to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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recipient parent and that absent waiver or agreement the obligor cannot reduce his
arrearages by payment to another source.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT OBTAINED PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER MR. TRACY.
Because Mr. Tracy was personally served an order to show cause and later

fully participated in two hearings before the trial judge, the district court obtained
and properly exercised personal jurisdiction in this matter.
In the present case, an order to show cause was the document, rather than a
summons, served on Mr. Tracy to apprise him of the pending hearing before the
court commissioner. See Record at 124, 130 for proof of service documents. Rule
4 does not directly speak to service of an order to show cause and Mr. Tracy
apparently relies on an assumption that the two should be treated the same for
purposes of this analysis. However, there are significant differences between an
initial action and an enforcement proceeding, and there is no authority stating that
service of an order to show cause must strictly comply with Rule 4. Rather, Rule
6(d) seems to apply to order to show cause actions: "Notice of a hearing shall be
served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a
different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may
for cause shown be made on ex parte application." Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Nonetheless, assuming the comparison is appropriate, let us assume that an
order to show cause is essentially the same as a summons. Rule 4 of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure describes the content of a summons, with its fundamental
purpose to ensure notice that is "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action."
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(B). Courts are directed to "construe the technical
requirements of Rule 4 in light of this guiding principle." State v. Hamilton, 2003
UT22,t28,70P.3dlll.
While Rule 4(c)(1) mandates that a summons "state the name, address and
telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs
address and telephone number," this requirement primarily serves to provide a
location to which an answer or response may be mailed. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).
However, this requirement is optional in certain pleadings such as a Request For
Protective Order pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act or a Verified Petition For
Ex Parte Child Protective Order. See www.utcourts.gov "Forms" section for
court-approved documents. This is likely to ensure safety to a person, who in the
context of abuse or domestic violence may have an added safety concern and wish
for that information to be kept from a Respondent, yet this highlights that address
and phone information is more functional than absolutely necessary for purposes
of personal jurisdiction.
The sole contention of Mr. Tracy on this issue is that because the order to
show cause served to him on December 29, 2009, did not contain Ms. Vicchrilli's
address and phone number, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction
over him and the subsequent proceedings are ineffectual. There is no argument
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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that he was not personally served, that he was not aware of the court and parties to
the action, that he did not understand the nature of the proceeding, or that he was
not informed of the date and time of the show cause hearing.
A review of the record shows that Ms. Vicchrilli did include her address
and phone number on the motion for order to show cause, affidavit in support of
motion for order to show cause, and order to show cause documents filed in the
district court. .See Record at 111, 112, and 115. However, the copies of the
documents served on Mr. Tracy appear to have been redacted by the serving entity
removing Ms. Vicchrilli's address and phone number. See Record at 124.
Notwithstanding, the original documents filed in court contained that information
and were available to Mr. Tracy upon request of a copy of the court file.
Mr. Tracy attempts to analogize the present case with Parkside Salt Lake
Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc.. 2001 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 1202, in which an unlawful
detainer action governed by statute as a summary proceeding required a special
court indorsement of a shortened Summons to be effective. Because this case does
not deal with unlawful detainer or shortened summons governed by statute, the
analogy is inapplicable.
Thus, the argument that the Order to Show Cause pleadings were not
effective to confer personal jurisdiction simply because they lacked an address and
phone number of Ms. Vicchrilli is not supported by law and is unpersuasive.
Furthermore, Mr. Tracy folly participated in two subsequent hearings
before the trial judge where he testified, made argument, and submitted evidence,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
a contain errors.

1

thus waiving the right to argue personal jurisdiction. See State Tax Comm. v.
Larsen, 110 P.2d 558 (Utah 1941) ("[T]he question of jurisdiction may be raised at
any time, by proper application, unless it has been waived by general
appearance."); see also, Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993)
("Waiver is deemed to occur when the totality of the circumstances indicates an
intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known constitutional right.").
For the above reasons, Mr. Tracy's request to hold that the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction should be denied.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND MR. TRACY IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR FAILURE TO PAY CHILD
SUPPORT.
In Utah, in order for a party to be found in contempt for failure to pay child

support, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the party (1)
knew what was required, (2) had the ability to comply, and (3) willfully failed to
follow the court's orders. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-315; Coleman v. Coleman,
664P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1983).
Only rarely does a court of review reverse the trial court's decision in a
contempt proceeding. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the absence of
any action [by the trial court] which is so unreasonable as to be classified as
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of... discretion, we will not overturn the
trial court's order." Dansie. 1999 UT App 92, If 6, 977 P.2d 539.
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Mr. Tracy did not argue below that he was without knowledge of the child
support order and the record clearly indicates that he had been served and was
aware of the child support order established in 1995.
It is a prerequisite to any contempt proceeding that the "one charged should
be found able to comply with the court's order or that he had intentionally
deprived himself of the ability to comply with such order." Osmus v. Osmus, 198
P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1948) (emphasis added by the court). The defense that an
obligor lacks the ability to pay court ordered support is only effective, where the
person charged exercises due diligence towards compliance of his obligation. See
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah 1978).
In Osmus, the Court held that when a valid order is in place "any failure to
comply or to make a reasonable effort to comply is contempt, and punishable as
such." 198P.2dat235. Furthermore, the Osmus Court held that a payor of
support does not have the right to sacrifice the rights of those he is obligated
towards so that "at some indefinite future time he may better his own financial
status." Id. The Court held that providing for those to whom he is obligated is his
first duty, and if he must forego opportunities with bright future prospects in order
to perform his obligations, the law requires him to do so. Id
In Mancil v. Smith, the Court illuminates this rationale, explaining that an
obligor cannot put off his responsibility of support by being voluntarily
unemployed or under-employed, because doing so would "hold hostage" a child's
right to ongoing support because of the "parent's desire to get a higher education,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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even if the parent's [training] will eventually allow the parent to pay support at a
higher level." 2000 UT App 378, H 16, 18 P.3d 509.
In Kessimakis, the obligor had failed to make support payments and
accrued arrears in the amount of $16,000.00. 580 P.2d at 1091. He claimed that
he was not in contempt of court, because he neither had the ability to pay or the
willful disobedience required for contempt. Id The court held that defense was
ineffective when the obligor did not at least exercise due diligence and make
reasonable efforts in compliance with the order. Id at 1092.
In the instant case, Mr. Tracy failed to pay support, making only three
token payments totaling $330.00 during an approximate five-year period. Mr.
Tracy's choice to further his education and employment in lieu of paying support
was an intentional deprivation of his ability to make his ordered payments.
Mr. Tracy testified at the July 26, 2010, to the following circumstances: 1)
that he had been working since the birth of the parties' daughter, 2) that he
attended higher education while working receiving a bachelor degree and a
master's degree and is currently pursuing a law degree, 3) that he worked as an
arms control specialist for the U.S. Army, 4) and that he worked as a clerk in a
German district court. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 34,
lines 7-17; page 35, lines 11-15, 20-23. These admissions provided clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Tracy had some ability, if not complete ability, to
comply with the support order. Mr. Tracy also admitted that he could currently
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make monthly payments notwithstanding his tight budget. See Brief of Appellant,
Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 36, lines 14-17.
Mr. Tracy's attempt to introduce irrelevant and false allegations that the
parties' daughter had not actually lived with Ms. Vicchrilli or that she had
secluded herself and their daughter during her minority further suggests that Mr.
Tracy had a motive and willfully refused to pay child support. See Brief of
Appellant, Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 17, lines 16-24; page 31, lines 9-22.
Finally, the district court's decision to award Ms. Vicchrilli monthly
payments to satisfy the arrearage deficit was a proper use of discretion. Child
support, when reduced to a judgment does not lose its character as a family
support instrument. Hamilton v. Regan, 938 P.2d 282, 284 (Utah 1997). It is
different from other forms of commercial or ordinary debt, and for this reason a
court has discretion to enforce the judgment by equitable means via providing a
payment plan. Id
The trial court appropriately made a finding that Mr. Tracy is in contempt
of the child support order, and exercised its discretion in requiring a minimum
monthly payment and providing Mr. Tracy an opportunity to purge his contempt.
Therefore, the trial court's findings and order on contempt should be affirmed.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AN OFFSET TO
MR. TRACY'S CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS.

Installments of support payments ordered in a domestic case become vested
in the recipient when they become due. Bates v. Bates. 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977);
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Larsenv. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977). See also, Bernard v. Attebury, 629
P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1981) (explaining that support payments become unalterable
debts as they accrue, and courts may not retroactively reduce or excuse past-due
support obligations).
An obligor is not entitled to receive credit for back-due support by later
directly paying the adult child unless written consent from the obligee is obtained
or a court finds good cause for issuing the offset. Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600,
603-04 (Utah 1979). Doing so would allow the obligor to vary the terms of the
court order and usurp the right to determine how the money should be spent. Id.
Rather, in Utah, support payments become unalterable debts as they accrue, owed
to the obligee, unless voluntarily waived in writing. Larsen, 561 P.2d at 1079; see
also Utah Code § 78B-12-109.
Mr. Tracy cites the case of Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah
1976), in support of the proposition that Ms. Vicchrilli waived her right to seek
back-due child support. Two clear differences, however, prevent Wasescha from
being applicable in the present case. First, in Wasescha, the obligee seeking an
award of arrearages had admitted that she was not seeking to "reimburse" herself
and the trial court found her overall testimony to be dubious at best. IcL at 895896. Second, Mr. Tracy's allegation that the parties' child had not resided with
Ms. Vicchrilli was unsupported, objected to, and false.
In the instant case, Mr. Tracy is seeking a $3,000.00 credit to his support
arrearages for money allegedly paid to the parties' daughter after she became an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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adult. Mr. Tracy testified the money was given for college expenses. Because
Ms. Vicchrilli never agreed that these payments to her daughter would act as a
credit for Mr. Tracy's arrearages, the payments can only be construed as a gift and
do not apply as a credit towards arrearages owed to Ms. Vicchrilli. Therefore, the
trial court's ruling should be upheld.
IV.

APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL
This Court "generally award[s] attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing

party if the trial court awarded attorney fees and the receiving party prevails on the
main issues on appeal." See Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, f 43, 45 P.3d 176.
Because Ms. Vicchrilli was awarded attorney fees below, it is reasonable and
proper for her to also be awarded her fees and costs incurred in defending against
this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee, Rebecca Vicchrilli, respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the Fourth District's ruling and judgment, and that
Appellee be awarded attorney fees and costs in this matter.
Dated: Uttcd<\ ** ( £ o l l
Respectfully Submitted,

Za^naiy^T Starr
Cdukselfor Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no
addendum is offered or necessary.
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